Intrinsic Liberty

The concept of intrinsic liberty is situated within the theory of human will — and it is that theory’s most significant political philosophical implication. The concept of intrinsic liberty denotes the primordial, substantive instantiation of human autonomy (that which depends on us) in its collective form. It is primordial because it is a true first instance and a condition of future experience. It is substantive in that it refers to actual, realized events. It is collective in the sense that it only emerges in interaction between people.

Ferdinand Tönnies’ widely misunderstood notion of Gemeinschaft opens a vista on the nature of liberty as such, and my rethinking of Tönnies’ theory of human will and specification of the concept of intrinsic liberty allows us to see its essence clearly. Tönnies’ arguments about Gesellschaft illuminate why institutions can protect the conditions of liberty yet cannot generate it.

If my theory is correct, at issue here is liberty as such, defined for the very first time on sound social theoretical ground within a coherent framework of significance.